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Abstract
The study explores the relationship between foreign exchange reserves (FER) and 
foreign borrowing (FB) within the framework of the management of capital flows. 
To investigate this relationship and examine the effect of capital control on foreign 
exchange reserves and external debt of two approaches are applied, the panel 
vector autoregression model (PVAR) and a traditional model of the reserve 
demand for 25 emerging countries over the period 1985-2019. The results show a 
negative association between FER and FB; the direction of the causality was from 
debts to reserves. Capital controls, as an instrument to reduce the short-term 
inflows, fail to restrict the accumulation of exchange reserves and conversely, 
succeed in limiting the recourse to foreign borrowing. Net foreign assets replacing 
foreign exchange reserves highlights different impacts of capital controls and raise 
the issue on a correct evaluation of foreign exchange reserves.
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1. Introduction
By considering the domestic outputs, the rise in foreign exchange reserves (FER) is 
now a recent discussion by financial policymakers. Moreover, the high volume of 
FER in emerging economies is supposed to have affected real interest rates, current 
account, and exchange rates (Aizenman and Jinjarak, 2019). According to Kharusi 
and Ada, (2018) FER are accumulated as a guarantee opposing the spillover risk 
of financial instability. Frequently, financial unbalances have a slight impact on 
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economies with a large stock of FED. Many countries, such as China, Hong Kong, 
Taiwan, and Singapore, have accumulated reserves, and all seemed to be relatively 
unharmed (Obstfeld et al., 2010). The accumulation of such reserves is achieved 
through a positive trade surplus and a large save of foreign currencies.
Likewise, the foreign borrowing (FB) increased at high levels for emerging 
economies, notably, for Asian and Latin American economies (Figure 1). The rise 
in FB is caused by the incentives created by the capital account openness that ease 
access to external funding (Aizenman, Jinjarak, and Park, 2015). Several reasons 
for this exorbitant progress are suggested as implications of financial openness. 
Developing economies approved this process and were decreased with the 2008 
crisis by the adoption of capital controls particularly in the short term.
The analysis applies a panel of 25 emerging countries experienced with capital 
controls for the period 1985-2019. Table 1-A in appendix displays the list of these 
countries which are defined as emergent according to the IMF classification. 
On the first hand, the study contributes to previous studies by employing a recent 
approach based on a panel VAR regression (Abrigo and Love, 2016). This approach 
allows using jointly panel data with VARs. A vast literature has focused on the 
explanation of foreign exchange reserves by foreign borrowing, but, surprisingly, few 
studies examine the reverse relationship that explains foreign borrowing by reserves. 
On the second hand, the study examines the impact of restrictive policies using 
capital controls on FER and FB (Eichengreen and Mody, 1999). As a response 
to the detrimental effects of capital account openness, emergent economies have 
reintroduced capital controls to limit the short-term capital inflows (Magud, 
Reinhart, and Kenneth, 2018; Farhi and Werning, 2014; Zehri and Abdelkarim, 
2020). An optimal combination between reserves accumulation, external debts, 
and restrictive policies on capital flows is considered crucial to the financial 
system stability (Aizenman et al., 2006; Jeanne and Ranciere, 2006). The empirical 
evidence suggests that capital controls may be an obstacle to the accumulation of 
exchange reserves when it reduces capital flow movements (Farhi and Werning, 
2014). Similarly, capital controls reduce access to external credit markets and 
therefore reduces the recourse to external debt (Bachetta et al., 2013). 
Through a traditional model of the demand for reserves (Lane and Burke, 2001; 
Obstfeld et al., 2010), the study highlights the function of FB in the reserve’s 
possession. The restrictive policy on capital flows, proxy by a dummy variable 
‘tax’, has also a crucial role to examine their impacts on FER and FB. Consequently, 
the main three policies often used in the optimal management of capital flows 
literature, FER, FB, and capital controls, were included in the empirical models 
(Jeanne, 2007; 2010). Many debates have also emerged about elements composing 
international reserves. The main is considering gold as part of foreign exchange 
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reserves (Flood et al., 2001). The study employs the variable ‘total of reserves and 
related items’ as defined by the World Bank (WDI database). For robustness checks 
and to be more precise about the definition of international reserves, the study uses 
the net foreign assets (NFA) instead of the international reserves variable (FER). 
The results highlight a clear relationship between foreign exchange reserves and 
external debts. In terms of causality, the direction exists from FER to FB, the opposite 
sense does not appear. These findings are also confirmed throughout the Impulse 
Response Functions analysis (IRFs), which shows a clear response of FB to a shock 
on FER, and oppositely, any response is detected for a shock of FER on FB. The 
restrictive policies using capital controls did not prevent emerging countries from 
accumulating exchange reserves, while it reduced foreign borrowing. Given the 
employ of net foreign assets as a dependent variable, the behavior of capital controls 
has changed providing an adverse impact on the accumulation of nets foreign assets.
The research hypotheses arising from the previous debate are summarized as 
follow: 
H1: FER can be explained by FB and no relationship can be identified for the 
opposite sense.
H2: Capital controls serve to reduce capital inflows and then to decrease the 
accumulation of FER.
H3: Capital controls, as an instrument of restrictive policies, will reduce the recourse 
to FB.
H4: Net foreign assets, considered as a substitute to FER, will have the same 
impacts of capital controls as on exchange reserves.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the literature review 
of the relationships FER, FB, and capital controls. The second section presents the 
models’ specification. Section three is divided into three parts; the first details the 
PVARs analysis. The second regresses a traditional model of international reserves. 
The third, for robustness check, introduce net foreign assets that substitute FER 
variable. The last section concludes and provides proposals for well-managing 
capital controls.
2. Literature review
Recent studies have highlighted the reasons for the buildup in official reserves in 
emerging markets since the 1980s. Ghosh et al., 2017 suggest that international 
reserves are accumulated as preventive demand against both current- and capital-
account shocks, furthermore as an effective policy to deal with the exchange rate 
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undervaluation. As a result of capital account crises of the 1990s, particularly in 
Asian countries in 1997, prevention against capital account shocks has become 
crucial and requires a satisfactory stock of foreign exchange reserves. The export 
booms following these crises have demonstrated the benefits of undervalued 
currencies for export-led growth. In the 2008 financial crisis, the undervaluation 
of the currency became also important in explaining the accumulation of reserves. 
This undervaluation can be deliberate through sterilized intervention. The author 
highlight that emerging economies are becoming more risk-averse and have learned 
that the potential shocks are larger than previously. 
The literature evidence highlight the excessive capital flows to emerging 
economies and approve, in some cases, the relationship between the FER with 
FB (Koepke, 2019). Primarily, raising resort to external debts gives a boost to 
reserve aggregation. Secondly, the accumulation of FER can be substituted by 
many possibilities of FB. If external transactions can be supported via debt, 
fewer reserves are required (Mody and Murshid, 2005). At the same time, a large 
volume of reserves can be considered as a guaranty to contract new external debts. 
International capital markets become more stable with a high stock of reserves 
accumulated. Contrarily, rollover risk and the likelihood of lender shocks are 
intensified when liquid assets are non-abundant (Feldstein, 1998).
Some other studies find several difficulties to establish a clear link between reserves 
and external debts (Summer 2006; Jeanne and Korinek, 2011). For a country, that 
recourse to foreign lenders and desires to apply an effective financial policy needs 
to analyze the ratios relating to both variables (reserves and debts). Unfortunately, 
the huge stock of FER holding by emergent countries cannot be only clarified by 
the standard ratio of reserves sufficiency (Cerutti et al., 2019). Moreover, the main 
sources of exchange reserves come from international trade, and regarding this 
framework, any relationship was found for FER and FB or vice versa (Eaton and 
Gersovitz, 1980). Landell-Mills (1989) suggest the possibility to obtain a root of 
funding reserves from borrowing, but international transactions are usually carried 
out directly by debt.
The theoretical and empirical literature on reserves/debts relationship can be 
approached in multiple ways. The study groups those under three concepts mainly 
debated in the managing capital flows literature: Guidotti-Greenspan rule; sudden 
stop and fire sale and prevention of financial instability.
2.1. Guidotti-Greenspan Rule, 1999
After the Korean crisis, a new rule of thumb is discussed by the International 
Monetary Fund. This rule consists to build a ratio regrouping the short-term 
external debt with the reserves sufficiency. Greenspan and Guidotti suggested 
that the economy should manage its foreign assets and their external debts. They 
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propose the “Guidotti-Greenspan rule” which country must accumulate reserves 
with sufficient amount to cover the external liabilities and to remain without the 
resort to external debt for at least one year.
 Greenspan (1999) improves “Guidotti-rule” by introducing a slight novelty that 
the maturities of external debts must surpass a determined period, for example, 3 
years. He also suggests using a “liquidity-at-risk” standard for which an economy 
must hold reserves that allow a strong probability to not resort to external debt for 
at least one year (95% probability). Some studies consider that emerging economies 
need to have adequate reserves relative to the demand for short-term external debt 
(Bussiere and Mulder, 1999). Therefore, these economies present a small trend to 
hold few reserves once they have a high level of short-term debt. Some studies 
disagree with this rule (Summers, 2006), they show that it was not respected by 
several emerging countries.
2.2. Sudden stop and fire sale
The damaging effects of short-term external debts in foreign currency are 
determined through many features such as an increase in the costs of a sudden stop, 
constraints in the credit market, and more exposition to financial vulnerabilities 
(Eichengreen, Hausmann and Panizza, 2003). Such effects conduct costly and 
precocious liquidation of investments. These effects become more intense when 
the level of foreign exchange reserves is low. This process can lead to higher 
deleveraging costs and lower resale price of investments (fire sale) Aizenman 
(2009). In emerging economies, the rise in the foreign currency demand increases 
the deleveraging pressure. Consequently, this pressure conducts an overvaluation 
of the exchange rate specifically when foreign exchange reserves are low and 
restricted. This will prompt banks to sell a large part of their investments to finance 
the repayment of their external debts.
Each bank supposes the feasible fire-sale price as a cluster. This is then considered 
as a fire-sale externality, somewhat similar to saturation (Krugman, 2000). Many 
studies are focused on the literature of “sudden stop” for capital inflows to analyze 
the relationship between FER, FB, and capital controls. Calvo and Reinhart (2000) 
suggest that developing economies can be creditworthy of their external liabilities 
when it was big inflows and unfortunately, solvency becomes more difficult in 
sudden stops periods and when these flows leave the country. Arce, Bengui, and 
Bianchi (2019) analyze a theoretical model of guarantee dealing with sudden-stop 
events. The combination of external debt, international reserves, and controls are 
analyzed when investors are risk-averse and the socks on productivity are equally 
distributed.
The possession of a satisfactory stock of international reserves and external debts 
will prompt effective tax smoothing. The ratio of FER to short-term external debt 
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tended to fulfill a prevent indicator of financial instability. Besides, the empirical 
studies are lesser decisive about the role of exchange reserves to predict financial 
crises. Some studies search for an optimal policy for managing capital flows 
(Jeanne and Rancière, 2006). Facing the random sudden stop, the authors define 
an optimal level of international reserves in a model explaining the smooth of 
national consumption. Summer (2006) contradicts previous studies by suggesting 
that the sudden stops theory presents many shortcomings, specifically a failure to 
prevent crises. This conclusion is valid also for economies that accumulate reserves 
exceeding the “Guidotti-Greenspan rule”. 
2.3. Prevention of financial instability
The facts show that accumulating more exchange reserves relative to short-
term external debt gives security to deal with an eventual financial instability in 
comparison to countries with few reserves. The ratio of international reserves 
/ external short-term debt is considered in many empirical studies as the main 
variable to signal a financial crisis. Also, the IMF studies praise this ratio as the 
most significant forecaster of reserves adequacy in developing countries (Jeanne 
2010 and IMF 2000). Short-term external debt is considered by Obstfeld et al. 
(2010) as an effective predictor of financial vulnerability specifically for the 
emerging countries. The reserves accumulation favors liquidity availability and 
reduces the vulnerability of an economy to external shocks, specifically with 
poor macroeconomic conditions. In the same way, Bussiere and Mulder (1999) 
show that short-term external debt as a percent of international reserves constitute 
a practical measure applied effectively to individual economy cases. The authors 
also utilize the log-ratio of short-term external debt to GDP as a further variable 
to their regressions explaining fluctuations of international reserves. Other studies 
suggest a simple benchmark for adequacy reserves (Wijnholds et al. 2001). Many 
variables are used in this benchmark but the most significant is the ratio of reserves 
to external debts. 
Some studies are focused on the social cost generated by holding FER. Rodrick 
(2006) estimates that the cost of holding reserves is expensive as the cost of 
foreign borrowing. The study proposes to reduce the level of FB instead of holding 
reserves and this proposition is more suitable for the case of emergent economies. 
Other studies are searching for an ideal policy to manage of FER, FB, and capital 
controls (Bianchi and Mendoza, 2018; Korinek 2010; Jeanne and Korinek 2011). In 
circumstances where households face borrowing constraints, Bachetta et al. (2013) 
have noted that the equilibrium of a liberalized economy might not be socially 
effective and if the three policies (FER, FB, and capital control) are well combined 
they can ameliorate the welfare. Jeanne (2010) has suggested that the optimal level 
of reserves is equal to short-term external debt level added by the cost of the crisis, 
and minus the opportunity cost of reserves accumulation. 
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Many recent studies examine the linkage of international reserves and external 
debts using panel regressions (Espinoza, 2014; Qian and Steiner, 2017; Arce et al. 
2019), but any of them has investigated this relationship with a panel VARs model 
(PVAR). Compared to other empirical methods, the panel VARs presents many 
advantages. First, when there are few theoretical studies on this relationship, the 
use of the VARs is recommended for the guidance of the model formulation. For 
our study, rare is the theoretical literature that examines, particularly, the causality 
from FB to FER. Second, the endogeneity bias presents a serious problem for many 
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empirical studies. Glick and Hutchison (2005); Kharusi and Ada (2018) and Qian and 
Steiner (2017) all take in consideration this problem of endogeneity, and have tried 
to solve it by including a lagged variables or by imposing additional restrictions to 
their regressions. VARs may reduce the endogeneity bias by considering all variables 
as probably endogenous. Third, following the VARs regressions, we can obtain 
the impulse response functions which record any retarded effects of the considered 
variables; the classical panel models are unable to display these dynamic effects. 
The missed variable bias is also considered with panel VARs by employing the 
country fixed effects, which catch time-unchanging parts that may affect both foreign 
exchange reserves and foreign debts. Panel VARs has also the merit to be used with a 
short temporary scale which may be compensated by the gain from the cross-sectional 
scale.
The first part of the empirical analysis employs a PVAR approach in which a system 
of two regressions relating foreign exchange reserves (FER) and foreign borrowing 
(FB) is presented. These equations will allow finding the causality direction between 
FER and FB. The PVAR models with specific random effects are defined as follows:
FERi,t = α1FERi,t–1 + α2FERi,t–2 + ... β1FBi,t + β2FBi,t–1 + ... + δXit + ui + eit (1)
FBi,t = α1FBi,t–1 + α2FBi,t–2 + ... β1FERi,t + β2FERi,t–1 + ... + δXit + ui + eit (2)
Where FER: foreign exchange reserves; FB: foreign borrowing. Xit: the vector 
of explanatory variables of FER and FB (trade, M2, GDP, pop, expo). ui and eit 
are vectors of dependent variable-specific panel random effects and idiosyncratic 
errors, respectively.
The second part aims to determine the impact of capital controls on foreign 
exchange reserves and foreign borrowing. Unfortunately, no previous study 
is made for this issue. The most robust path is to use a traditional model of the 
demand for reserves and to include our proxy of capital controls. We follow the 
studies of Obstfeld et al., 2010; Lane and Burke, 2001; Aizenman et al., 2003 who 
also employed this model. We include our dummy variable “tax” as a proxy of 
capital controls to explain the logarithm of FER. This dummy variable cannot be 
introduced in the PVAR model for robustness reasons for the model. The traditional 
model of reserves used is defined as follow: 
ln(FER)t = α0 + α1ln(pop)t + α2ln(trade)t + α3ln(FB)t + α4(tax)t + 
+ α5ln(M2)t + α6ln(expo)t + α7ln(GDP)t + εt   
(3)
Similarly, we define the model explaining foreign borrowing as follow:
ln(FB)t = α0 + α1ln(trade)t + α2ln(pop)t + α3ln(FER)t + α4(tax)t + 
+ α5ln(M2)t + α6ln(expo)t + α7ln(GDP)t + εt 
(4)
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4. Empirical data and analysis
The empirical literature highlights a set of variables explaining foreign exchange 
reserves and external debts. We present here a brief review of these variables. 
Heller (1966) has begun the modern study of optimal international reserves and 
shows the big role of trade openness (trade) in the accumulation of reserves. The 
population (pop) is also considered a relevant variable, it measures the country’s 
size. When the size of the country is large it may accumulate more reserves and 
resort more often to external debts (Lane and Burke, 2001). The financial depth is 
an explicative variable of international reserves and foreign borrowing. According 
to Obstfeld et al. (2010), the size of domestic financial liabilities is proxy by the 
M2/GDP ratio (M2) that can be shifted into foreign currency. The export volatility 
(expo) offers a prudential incentive for keeping international reserves and usually 
presented as a proxy for international financial instability (Aizenman and Marion, 
2003). The Gross Domestic Product per capita (GDP) considered the most 
representative macroeconomic indicator of a country’s economic strength. With 
a high GDP growth rate, the country may increase international reserves and will 
enjoy the confidence of borrowers to have more external debts (Grubel, 1971; 
Frenkel, 1974; Landell-Mills, 1989; Bordo and Eichengreen, 1998). The capital 
controls constitute the main variable of the study. These controls are proxy by “tax” 
that takes 0 for no capital controls and 1 when controls exist. This dummy variable 
is set by monitoring the dates of instituting restrictions on capital flows in each 
country of the sample. The variables FER and FB will be defined, respectively, as 
dependent variables in equation (3) and (4) and if not will be presented among the 
explanatory variables to define their impacts on each other (Cheung and Ito, 2009). 
The data of all variables are gathered from two main sources, the International 
Financial Statistics database (IFS) of the International Monetary Fund and the 
World Development Indicators (WDI) of the World Bank.
Table 1 summarizes the variables used in the empirical models. The de jure capital 
controls “tax” range from 0 to 1 (any controls to largest controls applied). The 
average controls are high (0.7) showing a tightness of restrictions among the sample 
countries. The standard deviation is low (0.15) proving the difficulty moving to 
a higher level of restrictions. The descriptive statistics highlight the great part of 
foreign exchange reserves, foreign borrowing, and net foreign assets in the global 
economy of emergent economies. The average across countries is superior to 20% 
of the country’s GDP. It was noticed a clear disparity and large heterogeneity of 
their accumulation across countries (the standard deviation exceed 10 for FER, FB, 
and NFA). 
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev Min Max
FER 21.30 11.05 3.96 52.89
FB 22.99 13.25 6.90 67.84
GDP 3.61 0.56 -0.45 18.24
pop 17.13 1.91 12.33 21.05
M2 13.81 2.64 2.20 35.34
expo 24.31 1.49 20.69 28.60
trade 14.12 0.61 2.21 54.39
tax 0.71 0.15 0 1
NFA 35.27 12.54 8.36 52.95
Source: author’s illustration
In the first part, the study employs PVARs to examine the linkage between the two 
variables, FER and FB. The study considers that the impact of the variables, on 
each other, appears only after one year at least, for this reason, we apply one delay 
on these variables. The following table displays the results of the PVARs analysis.
Table 2: PVAR analysis for FER and FB
Coefficient Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
FER
FER_1 0.01 0.05 0.17 0.86 -0.99 0.11
FB_1 -0.22 -0.56 -4.00 0.00 -0.33 -0.11
trade_1 3.54 0.46 7.58 0.00 2.62 4.45
M2_1 -1.87 0.44 -4.21 0.00 -2.74 -0.99
pop_1 -1.48 0.23 -8.76 0.00 -2.87 -1.56
expo_1 2.03 0.32 7.58 0.00 2.43 4.36
GDP_1 0.22 0.22 1.00 0.31 -0.21 0.65
FB
FER_1 -0.74 0.28 -2.62 0.01 -0.12 -0.01
FB_1 0.79 0.03 21.24 0.00 0.72 0.87
trade_1 0.28 0.15 1.86 0.06 -0.14 0.57
M2_1 -1.01 0.16 -6.03 0.00 -1.35 -0.68
pop_1 -2.48 0.25 -9.76 0.00 -2.91 -1.98
expo_1 0.36 0.28 1.96 0.04 -0.24 0.64
GDP_1 0.82 0.98 8.36 0.00 0.63 1.01
Source: author’s illustration
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PVAR is followed by a Granger causality analysis to determine the direction of 
the causality of FER and FB. The causal relationship, as detailed above, remains 
undefined, and this section will allow us to shed some light on this debate. The 
results of the causality test are presented in Table 3.
Table 3: Granger causality test
Equation Excluded Chi2 df Prob > chi2
FER
FB 15.98 1 0.000
trade 27.32 1 0.000
M2 17.69 1 0.000
pop 8.95 1 0.003
GDP 1.004 1 0.316
expo 30.11 1 0.002
ALL 187.31 6 0.000
FB
FER 6.83 1 0.319
trade 3.46 1 0.063
M2 36.32 1 0.000
pop 45.12 1 0.000
GDP 69.97 1 0.000
expo 50.10 1 0.003
ALL 248.67 6 0.000
Source: author’s illustration
The analysis is deviously based on a demand for reserves model in which, after 
controlling the explanatory variables (trade, M2, pop, expo, GDP), the impact of 
FER on FB is interpreted as evidence of theoretical and empirical literature. We do 
this by relying on the orthogonalization of impulse responses (IRFs). This method 
detail the reply of one variable to the changes in a different variable in the VARs, 
with keeping all other changes equal to zero (Abrigo and Love, 2016). 
Figure 2 draws the evolution of the IRFs.
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In the second part, the study employs the traditional model of the demand for reserves. 
First, we explain the foreign exchange reserves by the control variables previously 
detailed, by the proxy of capital controls “tax”, and by foreign borrowing variable. 
Second, we regress the same model using FB as the dependent variable. Tables 4 and 
5 display respectively, the results of the regression for equations 3 and 4.
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Table 4: Regression model FER = f (FB, tax)
FER Coefficient Std. Err. Z p>|z| [95% Confidence Interval]
FB -0.09 0.04 -0.24 0.81 -0.09 0.07
tax 0.51 0.21 2.40 0.01 0.09 0.94
GDP 0.82 0.10 8.08 0.00 0.62 1.02
pop 0.91 0.13 6.72 0.00 0.64 1.17
M2 0.19 0.24 0.81 0.42 -0.28 0.68
expo 0.80 0.36 2.19 0.02 0.08 1.52
trade 0.61 0.23 2.65 0.02 0.15 1.06
cons -4.66 2.61 -1.79 0.07 -9.77 0.45
Source: author’s illustration
Table 5: Regression Model FB = f (FER, tax)
FB Coefficient Std. Err. Z p>|z| [95% Confidence Interval]
FER 0.28 0.27 1.02 0.30 -0.25 0.81
tax -0.32 0.76 -2.48 0.04 -0.23 0.81
GDP 0.62 0.18 3.29 0.00 0.25 0.99
pop -1.10 0.40 -2.73 0.01 -1.89 -0.31
M2 0.82 0.39 2.08 0.03 0.04 1.60
expo 0.80 0.36 2.19 0.02 0.08 1.52
trade 0.70 0.37 1.91 0.05 -0.01 1.43
cons 21.63 6.22 3.48 0.01 9.44 33.83
Source: author’s illustration
Several critics have been addressed to the exact definition of foreign exchange 
reserves, their components, and the problem to consider gold as part of this variable 
(Flood et al., 2001). When foreign exchange reserves are measured by international 
financial institutions, several items may be introducing to this measure, among 
them there is especially a debate regarding gold. In practice and as an example, 
the European central banks, in 2000, retained approximately $226 billion of 
foreign-exchange reserves, not including their large gold holdings. Flood et al., 
(2001) have found that the trends are modified when measured reserves include 
gold holdings. These later represent an interesting part of countries’ reserve assets 
within the guidance of the Bretton Woods arrangement. Several empirical analysis 
has examined the factors of financial crises in the 1980s and 1990s by employing 
a reserves calculation that excludes gold. Thus if models of reserve accumulation 
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over the last forty years are to be reviewed, gold must be considered. Our study 
uses the definition of the World Bank that define foreign exchange reserves by 
“reserves and related items” that include gold holdings. 
As a response to this puzzle and for robustness check, the study replaces FER by 
nets foreign assets (NFA). The following model is regressed using NFA as the 
dependent variable and Table 6 displays the results of this regression.
Table 6: Regression Model NFA = f (FB, tax)
NFA Coefficient Std. Err. Z p>|z| [95% Confidence Interval]
FB 0.29 0.98 0.34 0.02 0.36 4.23
tax -0.36 5.17 -2.06 0.04 -20.82 -0.50
GDP 1.49 3.89 0.38 0.70 -6.16 9.14
pop 0.30 1.63 4.44 0.00 43.65 72.95
M2 -0.32 6.02 -0.88 0.37 -17.17 6.51
expo 0.13 0.28 2.54 0.03 0.07 1.63
trade -0.01 6.33 -2.72 0.01 -29.66 -4.76
cons -3.38 7.83 -5.54 0.00 -13.96 -9.81
Source: author’s illustration
The PVAR model (equation 1), explaining the FER by the determinants of reserves, 
show a negative and significant coefficient of FB (Table 2). This result confirms 
the findings of Lane and Burke (2001). The authors have studied the determinants 
of cross-country changes in the level of foreign-exchange reserves over 1981-
1995. They establish some empirical linkage that may develop new theoretical 
patterning of reserves conduct. They consider Reserves as collateral for borrowing 
on world capital markets and as a determinant of the likelihood of default on credit. 
Similarly, few reserves may reflect an increased probability of default on credit 
markets and can conduct to greater debts charges which are commonly proxied by 
interest rate spreads on international financial markets. For emergent economies, 
the authors have found a partial negative correlation between the level of external 
debt and reserves.
This result is also in accordance with Obstfeld et al. (2010). The authors identified 
negative coefficients of foreign borrowing variables on reserves holdings. They 
developed a financial-stability model that explains reserve accumulation in the 
modern framework of globalized capital markets. Their main finding is that external 
debt factors for reserve accumulation highlight that a negative (capital outflow) 
balance-of-payments shock can arise from the capital account when the export 
assets to outside unexpectedly stop. 
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The findings of the second equation, display also a negative association between 
the two variables. The FER coefficient is negative and significant showing that the 
accumulation of foreign exchange reserves reduces the country’s foreign borrowing. 
With a significance level of 1%, the PVAR Granger causality test displays only one 
direction causality from FER to FB (Table 3). Figure 2 reports graphs of IRFs for 
the VARs with two variables estimated (FER and FB) for the sample of countries. 
It supports our claim that FB explains the accumulation of FER and shows that 
the impact of the FB shock on FER takes more than 5 years until it goes out. 
Oppositely, no impact was found of FER on FB.
The second approach using a traditional model of the demand for reserves 
and including the capital controls proxy shows that emerging economies have 
succeeded to accumulate exchange reserves although the restrictive policy applied 
on capital flows. Table 4 displays a positive and significant coefficient of “tax” 
on reserves. This result is common to the China case. This country is known for 
its restrictive policy on capital movements while it is very active in the capital 
market by accumulating a huge stock of foreign exchange reserves. Bachetta et al. 
(2013) have suggested an optimal accumulation reserves model for China in which 
the Chinese central bank should motivate credits to the private sector and at the 
same time accumulate foreign exchange reserves. Capital controls do not pose a 
barrier to this process. The authors find that a country can benefit from rapid growth 
without applying capital account liberalization. In the Chinese context, they explain 
excessive reserve holdings by the interest rate spreads, domestically, and externally. 
The reserves accumulation in China has exceeded that of an open economy. 
Concerning the management of capital controls and foreign exchange reserves, 
Bachetta et al. (2013) have developed a model where households face a credit 
restriction; they found that an optimal competitive equilibrium of a liberalized 
economy can be reached with a combination of capital controls and reserve policy.
According to the results of Table 4, FB has a negative but insignificant association 
with FER. As previously debated, the direct relationship of FB to FER is weakly 
debated in the empirical literature. The insignificant coefficient of FB proves the 
difficulty to establish a clear relationship (Table 4). The result joins Lane and 
Burke (2001) and Obstfeld et al. (2010) who did not find any impact of external 
debts. Table 5 shows a negative and significant coefficient of ‘tax’, suggesting 
that capital controls may reduce debts contracted in foreign currencies. Globally, 
from the results of Tables 4 and 5, capital controls, applied by emerging countries, 
have failed to limit the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves and contrarily, 
succeed to reduce the level of external debts (Espinoza, 2014).
For the control variables, the most relevant findings are those of the M2 variable 
which is measured by the ratio M2/GDP. This variable accomplishes a major role 
in the rise of FB (Table 5), and at the same time, defines the vulnerability of an 
economy to the financial risks. The empirical literature on the financial crises 
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(Obstfeld, 2012; Mulder et al., 1999; Glick and Hutchison, 2005 and De Beaufort-
Wijnholds et al., 2001) consider the M2 monetary aggregate as a proxy of financial 
instability. This literature highlights a clear linkage between exchange reserves and 
financial instability. Reserve holdings are used as a key tool to deal with internal 
financial instability in a world of growing financial integration. Based on these 
studies, domestic financial liabilities including foreign currency, capital account 
openness, access to foreign currency through foreign borrowing markets, and 
exchange rate policy are all significant determinants of reserve holdings. Recently, 
Aizenman (2019) suggests that the liabilities of the financial system, especially, 
those denominated in foreign currency, are elements of M2 and a significant part of 
these liabilities comes from external debts. Excessive international reserves do not 
prevent a country’s financial instability. Aizenman (2019) highlights the role of these 
external debts in this instability. He argues his opinion by the experience of Korea 
and Mexico during and after the world financial crisis. For these cases, a large stock 
of international reserves does not avoid a country from financial instability and it is 
above all a because of a heavy balance sheet of foreign currency loans.
The results of the replacement of FER by NFA are displayed in Table 6. The 
estimates show a positive coefficient of FB demonstrating that external debts 
encourage the accumulation of NFA. Contrarily, the coefficient of “tax” is negative 
and significant showing that capital controls reduce the NFA. The stocks of NFA 
are usually created by commercial banks and allow them to resort to external 
debts. This opportunity can be weakened by the use of capital controls, explaining 
the negative coefficient of “tax”. Admitting that central bank has the authority to 
stock foreign exchange reserves and commercial banks can participate to the 
accumulation of net foreign assets, it can be assumed that the policies, sometimes 
divergent, of the central bank and the commercial banks, explain the changes in the 
sign of “tax” in the Tables 4 and 6. 
5. Results and discussion 
The study is part of the capital flows management framework and has developed 
significant results. The analysis has grouped three main policies often used in 
studies searching an optimal policy for managing capital flows: foreign exchange 
reserves, foreign borrowing, and capital controls. 
Starting with examining the links that may exist between foreign exchange reserves 
and external debts, the results of the PVAR model confirmed this association. 
Table 2 shows significant coefficients of FB and FEF, respectively, in equations 1 
and 2. The presence of this relation supports the theoretical literature previously 
detailed. When a country obtains external debts, this may raise the stock of 
exchange reserves, similarly, a country with highly stock reserves going to have the 
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confidence of international borrowers to provide these debts denominated in foreign 
currency. These reserves constitute a kind of guarantee in the event of default of 
reimbursement.
Surprisingly, Table 2 shows a negative sign of both coefficients of FER and FB, 
stating a negative impact of external debts and exchange reserves, one upon the 
other. This can be explained by the fact that a country which has satisfactory foreign 
exchange reserves will not need to resort to external debt, and similarly, a country 
without a sufficient stock of foreign exchange reserves will request external credits 
to pay its international trade transactions. Thus, an inverse relationship is established 
which may explain the negative coefficients of reserves and external debts.
The results of the causality test displayed in Table 3, show causality in one 
direction, from FB to FER, and suggesting that external debts explain the evolution 
of foreign exchange reserves. These results are confirmed by the IRFs graphs which 
show that a shock on external debts will harm foreign exchange reserves and this 
impact survives 5 years before disappearing. Foreign exchange reserves are more 
sensitive to changes in external debts. The observation is obvious to what extent a 
large part of the foreign exchange reserves accumulated by the emerging countries 
come mainly from external debts. A shock to these debts (for example, a sharp drop 
in external debts) will negatively affect the reserve stock and this effect will last a 
long period. The second part of the study has introduced capital controls impacts. 
The results of the traditional model of the demand for reserves have shown these 
impacts on reserves and external debts. 
Capital controls are part of a country’s restrictive policy to reduce capital flows, 
especially short-term ones. These controls were expected to stop or at least reduce 
foreign exchange reserves, the results in Table 4 show a positive coefficient for the 
“tax” index and unexpectedly, capital controls did not prevent the accumulation 
of foreign exchange reserves. When a country applies capital controls it is mainly 
to prevent movements of speculative capital flows and not flows which bring in 
foreign exchange reserves. Restrictive policies applied by emergent economies, 
in terms of capital control, are selective and mainly target flows which harm the 
financial system (short-term speculative flows). Regarding the impact of capital 
controls on foreign borrowing, the coefficient of “tax” in Table 5 is significant and 
negative. This result highlights the adverse impact of controls on debts. At a later 
stage, they are harmful to the economy, especially when their levels are high. The 
establishment of capital controls, as previously detailed, will target these flows.
Considering net foreign assets as a close variable to foreign exchange reserves, 
the coefficient of “tax” in Table 6 presents a different impact of capital controls 
in which there is a reduction of NFA. These multiple results of “tax” still raise the 
debate, discussed in the previous section, on the dilemma to find an exact measure 
of foreign-exchange reserves.
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The study has contributed to the empirical literature of the management of capital 
flows by using two-approach PVAR and the traditional model of the demand for 
reserves. As our knowledge, it was the first time to examine the linkage between 
reserves and debts and to consider the role of capital controls within these 
approaches. The study gives some lessons to economic policymakers. On the one 
hand, a complementary or opposite linkage can be found between foreign-exchange 
reserves and external debts. This mainly depends on the objectives set by a country 
and according to the charges associated with the external debts. Foreign borrowing, 
if properly allocated, often considered as an engine for investment and growth. An 
arbitrage in terms of opportunity cost can be decided to resort to external debts or 
not. On the other hand, capital controls are instruments usually utilized to reduce 
short-term capital inflows. These controls must be oriented to the flows that harm 
the economy. The policymakers may evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of 
the entry of these flows, particularly those in forms of external debts. Depending 
on their undesirable effects, the intensity of capital controls to be established is 
decided. This explains why some countries have successfully used capital controls 
to promote their economy while others have failed. This debate leads us to open 
other research notably on the effectiveness of capital controls.
6. Conclusions
With the effort of emerging countries to reduce the high level of their external debts, 
we have noticed an increased accumulation of foreign exchange reserves. This 
observation has been demonstrated empirically following a negative relationship 
between the variables FB and FER. The results allow us to confirm the first 
research hypothesis with clear evidence on the impact of FB on FER, this impact is 
not approved in the opposite direction. The current account surpluses are performed 
by emerging countries that have accumulated sizable reserve stocks, and; therefore, 
lower their external debts (Ranciere and Jeanne, 2006). 
The restrictive policy using capital control did not prevent emerging countries 
from increasing their stock of international reserves when these controls succeeded 
in reducing the recourse to external debt. The second hypothesis is infirmed, 
unexpectedly, the accumulation of exchange reserves is not stopped by capital 
controls, while, the third hypothesis is confirmed. Net foreign assets employed as a 
substitute for foreign exchange reserves show a different behavior of capital controls. 
These later reduce the accumulation of foreign assets, infirm the fourth hypothesis, 
and again raise the issue on the components to include in international reserves.
Several shortcomings can be addressed to this study, such as the choice of the proxy 
variable for capital controls “tax”, several studies use other proxies, in particular, 
the KAOPEN index of Chinn and Ito and/or indexes established by monitoring the 
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reforms provided by The Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions of the International Monetary Fund.
Other limits arise about the use of foreign exchange reserves, the exact definition of 
this variable differs across countries, we replaced it with nets foreign assets but the 
results found were different. Certainly, like any empirical analysis, inquiries can be 
asked about the choice of the empirical methods, the sample, the analysis period, 
etc. These shortcomings can serve as guidelines to improve the study, in particular 
with a more robust choice for capital control proxies, international reserves, etc. 
Likewise, resort to other types of models or to expand the sample and/or the 
analysis period.
In conclusion, while sustaining some of the previous studies, the paper also displays 
a simple approach that could be applied to further explore the optimal policy 
for managing capital flows across different countries. This optimal policy will 
undoubtedly involve the use of capital controls which will mainly target short-term 
external debts flows but which will keep the opportunity to the country to increase 
its stock of foreign-exchange reserves.
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Kontrola kapitala u svrhu upravljanja deviznim pričuvama  
i inozemnim zaduživanjima 
Chokri Zehri1
Sažetak
U ovom radu istražuje se odnos između deviznih rezervi (FER) i inozemnog 
zaduživanja (FB) u okviru upravljanja kapitalnim tokovima. Da bi se istražio ovaj 
odnos i ispitao učinak kontrole kapitala na devizne pričuve i inozemne dugove za 
25 zemalja u razvoju tijekom razdoblja 1985. - 2019.godine, primjenjena su dva 
pristupa: model autoregresije panelnih vektora (PVAR) i tradicionalni model 
potražnje deviznih pričuva. Rezultati pokazuju negativnu povezanost između 
FER-a i FB-a, a smjer uzročnosti je od dugova prema deviznim pričuvama. 
Kontrola kapitala, kao uspješna politika za ograničavanje kratkoročnih tokova, ne 
utječe na akumuliranje deviznih pričuva i, suprotno, smanjuje kratkoročne vanjske 
dugove. Korištenje neto inozemne imovine umjesto deviznih rezervi ukazuje na 
različite utjecaje na inozemne dugove i stoga se nameće pitanje o mogućnosti 
točne procjene deviznih pričuva. 
Ključne riječi: kontrola kapitala, dugovi, rezerve, inozemna sredstva/inozemna 
imovina
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Appendix
Table 1-A: List of Sample Countries
Brazil Indonesia South Korea Algeria
Chile Malaysia Hungary Pakistan
Colombia Thailand China Poland
Egypt Taiwan Peru Ecuador
Greece South Africa Russia Vietnam
India Mexico Philippines Turkey
Nigeria
